1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3		
4	PEOPLE,	
5	Respondent,	
6	-against-	100
7	CHARLES SMITH,	No. 109
8	Appellant.	
9		
10	PEOPLE,	
11	Respondent,	
12	-against-	110
13	TYRELL INGRAM,	No. 110
14	Appellant.	
15		-
16	PEOPLE,	
17	Respondent,	
18	-against-	27. 111
19	ISMA MCGHEE,	No. 111
20	Appellant.	
21		-
22		20 Family Character
23		20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207
24		June 01, 2016
25		

1	Before:	CHILD TUDGE TANEE DISTORE
2		CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE F. PIGOTT, JR
3		ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHEILA ABDUS-SALAAM
4		ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY
5		ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
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2	Appearances:
_	CLAUDIA B. FLORES, ESQ.
3	CENTER FOR APPELLATE LITIGATION
4	Attorneys for Appellant Smith 120 Wall Street, 28th Floor
-	New York, NY 10005
5	
_	PATRICIA CURRAN, ADA
6	NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Respondent
7	One Hogan Place
-	New York, NY 10013
8	
	ELSA MITSOGLOU ESQ.
9	CARDOZA APPEALS CLINIC
1.0	Attorneys for Appellant Ingram
10	55th Avenue New York, NY 10003
11	New IOLK, NI 10003
	RAFFAELINA GIANFRANCESCO, ADA
12	BRONX COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
	Attorneys for Respondent
13	111 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd.
1.4	White Plains, NY 10601
14	MARK W. ZENO, ESQ.
15	CENTER FOR APPELLATE LITIGATION
	Attorneys for Appellant McGhee
16	120 Wall Street
	New York, NY 10005
17	
1.0	SYLVIA WERTHEIMER, ADA NEW YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
18	Attorneys for Respondent
19	One Hogan Place
	New York, NY 10013
20	
21	
22	
4 4	
23	
24	
٥٦	Sara Winkeljohn
25	Official Court Transcriber

1 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: The first matter on 2 today's calendar is number 109, People v. Charles 3 Smith. MS. FLORES: Good afternoon, Your Honors; 4 5 Claudia Flores, Center for Appellate Litigation for the appellant, Charles Smith. I'd like to request 6 7 two minutes of my time for rebuttal. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two 8 9 minutes, Ms. Flores. MS. FLORES: 10 Thank you, Your Honor. The 11 trial court in this case should not have completely 12 restricted defense counsel from inquiring about the 13 federal civil rights lawsuits filed against the two officer witnesses. First, the court erred in 14 15 concluding that the lawsuits had no relevance to the 16 officers' credibility. This is a case where the 17 officers' credibility was a key issue and a close issue. It was the centerpiece of defense counsel's 18 strategy. And all three of - - -19 20 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel, did - - - did 21 defense counsel make the argument that it was about 22 credibility or was that a general argument or did 23 defense counsel make some other arguments?

MS. FLORES: Yes, Your Honor, the defense

counsel explicitly said this - - - this goes directly

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Т	to the officers' credibility, and the trial court
2	responded with this there's nothing to this
3	that goes to credibility. So the trial court ruled
4	on the grounds that these lawsuits were not relevant
5	to credibility, and that was error. These lawsuits
6	are relevant to credibility and defense counsel
7	should have not been completely restricted from
8	inquiring about them. The trial court certainly had
9	dis the discretion to limit the method and the
10	extent of the questioning, but it did not have the
11	discretion to limit
12	JUDGE RIVERA: So what what could you
13	have asked?
14	MS. FLORES: Defen
15	JUDGE RIVERA: What what would trial
16	counsel have asked?
17	MS. FLORES: Correct, and and some of
18	the questions defense counsel may have posed, for
19	example, may not have been the perfect questions to
20	ask, but defense counsel certainly could have asked -
21	
22	JUDGE RIVERA: You mean you you agree
23	that that counsel could not ask have you been
24	sued?

MS. FLORES: Correct.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Tell me what - - -

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MS. FLORES: Counsel could not have asked you - - - have you been sued, should not have asked how much - - - you know, were - - - was this settled for 50,000 dollars. But defense counsel certainly could have asked about the underlying acts alleged in the lawsuit. So he could have asked is it true that you arrested Mr. Ambos or Mr. Logalici and actually you did have - - - you had no grounds for that arrest. You actually did not, in fact, witness a drug sale and yet, you went forward with that arrest anyway even though he had committed no crime.

JUDGE FAHEY: Well, wouldn't he - - - wouldn't defense counsel have to establish - - - you can't ask somebody if they've - - - if they have committed a crime unless they've been conv - - - since he hasn't been convicted. You can't ask somebody if there's an allegation against them and that would be - - - so where is the foundation, I guess, is what I'm wondering, to ask these questions. I understand what questions they could ask but that doesn't establish the foundation to ask the questions.

MS. FLORES: Correct. The foundation comes out of the lawsuits themselves and that's where - - -

1	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, okay. So defense
2	counsel come in and say these are the lawsuits, put
3	them in the record, put the papers in the record.
4	Did did he say that these are the questions
5	that I would be asking regarding these lawsuits to
6	the underlying facts of the lawsuits themselves to
7	establish a proper foundation and then from there
8	- outside the presence of the jury, and then from
9	there go forward. Was that done at all?
10	MS. FLORES: It was attempted. Defense
11	counsel said I have federal documents. The court
12	said do you have them? He said I do have them. I
13	have one lawsuit that was settled for this amount. I
14	have two other lawsuits against the other witness.
15	These are very similar facts. These involve
16	JUDGE FAHEY: So so your your
17	position is I don't mean to cut you off just to
18	kind of because you only have so much time.
19	MS. FLORES: Yeah.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: So your position is then that
21	he attempted to establish a foundation and the trial
22	court cut him off?
23	MS. FLORES: Correct. He did attempt. He
24	he laid out all the necessary information that

the trial court needed to know that there was a good

1	faith basis here for questioning. And cert
2	JUDGE RIVERA: So were there answers filed
3	in the lawsuits denying the allegations?
4	MS. FLORES: I believe there were. They -
5	
6	JUDGE RIVERA: So so he's going to
7	say he's going to deny, right? You expect
8	something else?
9	MS. FLORES: He might deny. But the
10	but the jury should still get to assess his demeanor
11	as part of his credibility. If this isn't something
12	he was expected, he might not be prepared to deny.
13	We we don't know. The point is if this was any
14	other type of witness, not a police officer, he
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Were you attempting to have
16	the actual documents of the lawsuit submitted into
17	evidence?
18	MS. FLORES: No, Your Honor. This is
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Could you?
20	MS. FLORES: No, Your Honor.
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Ruled in favor of your
22	client, could you? Would that be the next step?
23	MS. FLORES: Not necessar perhaps.
24	The the record here is not fully developed
25	enough in this case to determine whether this

1	actually would have gone to a material issue at
2	trial, say a scheme by these officers to consistently
3	lie about observation drug sale cases, then it would
4	have been a really a material issue where the
5	extrinsic evidence would have been admissible. But
6	if we're just talking about credibility, about
7	attacking that, no, they they shouldn't have
8	introduced it.
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Do you
10	JUDGE RIVERA: As some settlements do,
11	sometimes the party agree basically to a gag order.
12	Could you have asked if there was if that was
13	included in the settlement?
14	MS. FLORES: That that's another
15	- that's a more complicated question. The the
16	point is, going back to the trial court's ruling,
17	which is that this wasn't relevant at all, if
18	if these had been any other witnesses, if these had
19	not been police witnesses, they could have asked
20	about these allegations and it wouldn't have mattered
21	where the allegations came from. For example, if I
22	hear, you know, talking about any kind of
23	JUDGE GARCIA: But counsel
24	MS. FLORES: prosecution

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, just to interrupt

you, but that's not what they were proffering, they wanted to ask. I mean there's a proffer of what this defense counsel wanted to ask, and it goes to the settlement amounts and were the underlying arrest cases dismissed. So what you're asking us to do - - - I mean and that's the judge ruled on. But now you're asking us to look underneath the proffer the defense counsel made that we have a record of and say there might have been facts in an underlying suit that, apparently, are not part of this record that we have that they could have asked about. And - - and I don't see how we can do that.

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MS. FLORES: Well, the record is not entirely clear. It - - it is a cold record, and it is hard to tell exactly what defense counsel was trying to ask about and what he could have asked about had the court not shut him down. As soon as he introduced the topic, the court said no, and the court said absolutely not. And eventually, after he proposed a line of questioning, said I will not do this, I'm taking the jury. So we don't know exactly what defense counsel could have asked - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But yes, we do, because he said he was going to ask were you involved in the arrest of this person. If so, isn't it true that the

1 case you made in an arrest and you said that this 2 person was guilty of a drug sale and yet the cases 3 were later dropped; isn't that a fact. And that's when the court says absolutely not. 4 5 MS. FLORES: And that way - - -6 JUDGE GARCIA: So do you think that's an 7

appropriate question to ask on cross?

MS. FLORES: The part about the charges being dismissed is not. But - - - but the problem here - - - so - - - so the heart of his question was appropriate. The heart of his question about was did you participate in this arrest and wasn't it not That's really what he was getting at. Whether true. he was asking about the dismissal of the charges is sort of a matter of semantics. What he's implying is that because the charges were dismissed, you must have been lying. That wouldn't have been the appropriate way to ask it, the way he was proposing, but it - - - it doesn't mean that he shouldn't have gotten to ask it a little bit differently. But the -

JUDGE STEIN: And then the court said absolutely not. And he said no, could I, and then the court turned him down.

MS. FLORES: Exactly.

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1	JUDGE STEIN: So we don't even we
2	- we
3	MS. FLORES: We don't know what
4	JUDGE STEIN: We have no idea what he was
5	going to say.
6	MS. FLORES: We don't know what he could
7	have said as an alternative. He wasn't given the
8	opportunity to proffer an alternative because the
9	- the real basis the court denied this request on was
10	relevance. They she said or Judge Mullen
11	said that this is absolutely not relevant to
12	credibility, so we don't know what how Justice
13	Mullen would have curtailed the questioning or framed
14	it.
15	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Could I take you back
16	to something you started to say, and it goes to
17	something that Judge Fahey raised, whether you'd need
18	a good faith basis or something else, foundation.
19	What is what is it that you say? Do you have
20	to have a foundation and a good faith basis or just a
21	good faith basis?
22	MS. FLORES: Well, they they could be
23	the same thing. I I think you only need to
24	have a good faith basis here. Looking to the cases

where we look at credibility for any other witnesses

or we look at prior bad acts that are not stemming from civil rights lawsuits, all that counsel has to show is a good faith basis. So, for example, in another context counsel could have wanted to ask a prosecution witness about an incidence of domestic violence. It could have been enough that counsel was told about that incident by the witness's wife.

That's a good faith basis. He wouldn't have needed to introduce documents to lay that foundation.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MS. FLORES: Thank you, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.

MS. CURRAN: Good afternoon, Your Honors; may it please the court, my name is Patricia Curran, and I represent the People on this appeal. First of all, the trial court properly precluded the proposed line of questioning that the defense counsel asked when he wanted to talk to the officers about pending and settled lawsuits.

JUDGE STEIN: How do we know what counsel would have asked if the court hadn't interrupted him?

MS. CURRAN: Your Honor, I don't believe the record shows that the court restricted defense counsel from making a full record. If you look at the transcript, you will see that there is a back and

1	forth between defense counsel and the judge for a
2	page-and-a-half, almost two pages about this. He
3	wasn't precluded him from making any record that he
4	wanted to. If he wanted to put the federal documents
5	that he referenced into marked as an exhibit
6	JUDGE STEIN: But what what did he
7	need to to have said?
8	MS. CURRAN: He needed to have said that he
9	wanted to ask about specific prior acts of misconduct
10	by these officers, and he needed to show that in the
11	federal complaints, that he referenced but never
12	marked as an exhibit, that he could show the two
13	officers at issue here, Zambrano and Lotufo, that
14	they were actually charged with and there were
15	allegations of specific misconduct by them.
16	JUDGE STEIN: So it's not enough to say I
17	have the pleadings here. This is my and
18	and it says that this is my good faith basis? You -
19	it has to be marked into evidence?
20	MS. CURRAN: Well, he could
21	JUDGE STEIN: It has to be a formal
22	proffer?
23	MS. CURRAN: He could have read it into the
24	record, but he certainly had to either read it into
25	the record or show somewhere in the documents

assuming that he was limiting himself to the documents as opposed to other possible good faith bases, that these officers had committed specific acts of misconduct. He never did that.

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JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: You mentioned something about pending lawsuits and unsettled lawsuits. Is that the criteria that - - - that something has to be settled or not pending? It has to be completed before one can ask a question about misconduct?

No, Your Honor. I think that MS. CURRAN: regardless of whether the lawsuits were pending or settled that the lawsuits themselves could allege in their documents specific acts of misconduct by the The federal documents that defendant now officers. claims he proffered at - - - at trial, though he never made a record of it below, never say that. They just have very general allegations against group of officers. They never alleged specific acts of misconduct about the two officer witnesses in this It could be that if these lawsuits had case. continued down the line through discovery and trial or things of that nature, that maybe those lawsuits offered specific acts of misconduct.

JUDGE RIVERA: So, counsel, let's say

1 you've got the complaint. The complaint says I was 2 standing on the corner listening to music. Officer 3 X, actually names the officer, came up, pushed me up against the wall, and arrested me. He arrested me 4 5 without probable cause. The charges were dismissed. Is that enough? How much - - - do you need more 6 7 specificity? MS. CURRAN: That certainly gives the 8 9 defendant a good faith basis for a specific act. 10 However, I don't think the inquiry is over at that 11 point. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 13 MS. CURRAN: The court, the trial court, 14 still has the obligation to weigh the prejudicial 15 value versus the probative value in these cases. JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. But you - - - you 16 17 would say that that is specific enough? 18 MS. CURRAN: It can be. Or - - -19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Aren't - - - aren't you 20 making the arguments that perhaps the court should 21 have made at the time that this was being discussed? 22 In other words, you say well, in the - - - in the 23 complaint there's just general allegations. It never got that far. He's - - - he's making the - - - the 24

motion and he gets halfway through his sentence

saying, "and the city settled for a large sum of 1 2 money" and the court says no. 3 MS. CURRAN: Well, because, Your Honor, below defense counsel focused solely on the pending 4 5 and settled lawsuits. He doesn't - - -JUDGE PIGOTT: What's wrong with that? 6 7 what I'm saying is you were saying well, the lawsuit 8 has general allegations. The judge didn't know that. 9 For all she knew, they - - - they could have been 10 specific alleg - - - she didn't let - - - she didn't 11 let anybody discuss what was going to be brought in; isn't that true? I mean she simply said no. 12 13 MS. CURRAN: I disagree with you, Your I think - - -14 Honor. 15 JUDGE PIGOTT: What does no mean? It - - it says, "And the only other question I have as far 16 17 as cross-examination is concerned, Your Honor, is there are a number of federal cases against the 18 19 officers in question for civil rights violations 20 under very similar facts where they made a narcotics 21 arrest, very similar on the facts, and the case was 22 then dropped by the DA and the city settled for a 23 large sum of money." The Court "No." 24 MS. CURRAN: But then the record goes on

for another page-and-a-half, Your Honor, where

they're talking - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: I understand that.

MS. CURRAN: - - - about this.

JUDGE PIGOTT: But what I'm saying is you were making arguments that the - - - the documents say one thing, the documents say another thing, there could be these allegations. She's saying no.

MS. CURRAN: I disagree that this court restricted this defense counsel from making a fuller record, particularly because he goes on to make a fuller record about why he thinks questions about lawsuits are appropriate and simply were not.

JUDGE PIGOTT: She says, "Do you actually have federal documents?" He says, "Absolutely, I have one case for Zambrano. And it's the two cases for Zambrano. Two defendants seem actually innocent." "Are they pending matters?" He says "Okay" and then - - - and then goes into a good description of them. And then before he gets done she says, "Absolutely not." Defense, "Nor could" - - - and the court says "We don't know why the cases were dismissed. We don't know." Well, ask. I mean why - - it - - it seemed clear to me that this judge was not going to allow these in, period. And every time the - - the lawyer wanted to make a

1	record with respect to this, he got a no, an
2	absolutely not, and and then finally she says
3	I'm calling the jury in. Let's go.
4	MS. CURRAN: But, Your Honor, if he had
5	wanted to talk about why the cases were dismissed, he
6	could have. It's more likely from this record that
7	he didn't have that information.
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: Let's assume for a minute
9	that he did, but we could put that aside. Do you
LO	think under any circumstances information such as was
L1	being offered here are admissible?
L2	MS. CURRAN: No, because they're only
L3	assertions.
L4	JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, so I'm what I'm
L5	trying to get at, do you see any way that an
L6	officer's an officer can be impeached by
L7	conduct that predates the the case in front of
L8	the judge?
L9	MS. CURRAN: Yes. If there are specific
20	factual allegations, not mere accusations that
21	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But have we allowed
22	accusations to be the good faith basis upon which
23	defense counsel or any counsel can cross-examine a
24	witness on credibility?
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MS. CURRAN: You could. The bar for good

faith basis is fairly low, but it also has to be a reasonable basis in fact, but it has to be specific.

Here, this lawyer focused totally on pending and - - and settled lawsuits, not about the specific acts that he claimed, at least, or he claims now, not below.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, but - - - but counsel is starting at that point saying this is the source of my knowledge about these bad acts. There are actual lawsuits. Doesn't the fact that one could see, reasonably, that an - - an attorney might want to point to the existence of a filing, a federal filing, to in fact impress upon the judge that these are not fly-by-night assertions, mere speculations, or someone who's just said something without risking, perhaps, sanctions.

MS. CURRAN: Defense counsel needed to do more. He needed to talk about what the specific allegations may have been.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So why was it - - - you said before no, these are mere assertions. But when I gave you my hypothetical, you said that sounds fine, now we've got to get to the prejudice prong.

What's the difference between what I described and what you say is deficient in these lawsuits, in the

Т	allegations?
2	MS. CURRAN: Because what the lawyer
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Because I only gave you
4	allegations, right?
5	MS. CURRAN: I understand. What the lawyer
6	wanted to ask here was simply about a pending
7	lawsuit. He wanted to say, "Were you involved in the
8	arrest of Joseph Logalici, and if so, isn't it true
9	that you made an arrest and you said Mr. Logalici was
10	guilty of a drug sale and yet the cases were later
11	dropped; isn't that a fact?" But he doesn't go and -
12	
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, could he ask were you
14	involved in the arrest?
15	MS. CURRAN: Without
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Why couldn't he ask that?
17	MS. CURRAN: Could he ask if he were
18	involved in the arrest of this person?
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Correct.
20	MS. CURRAN: Perhaps, but it's still
21	subject to the probative value prejudice test, and
22	I'm not sure that just asking that is going to be
23	sufficient.
24	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Well, how did
25	how does counsel get to the point where he can ask

specific questions about a particular scenario or incident without at least setting some kind of context like this was an arrest? I'm - - - I'm just unclear. Is - - - is counsel supposed to just say something like is it a fact that you mistreated somebody named - - - or - - or you severely restricted the rights of somebody named Logalici. I - - I'm not clear how one would get into that without saying - - giving some kind of context or background for the questions.

MS. CURRAN: Well, let's take an easier example. Let's assume there was a - - - a federal complaint pending that said the plaintiff in the federal lawsuit had observed Officer Jones steal property from the plaintiff on such-and-such a date and such-and-such a time when he was arresting him. That's a specific allegation of an officer who was testifying at the time. Obviously, a theft is something that goes to the credibility of - - - of the officer, and there's a specific allegation of conduct.

As opposed to what's in these federal documents that they proffer only on appeal and never to the second - - on the second trial, by the way, never to the second judge. These are only general

allegations of misconduct by a group of officers.

They don't name, with one minor exception, the two officers who testified here at all. This lawyer had to do a little bit more research and come up with more specific allegations against these officers before he could be allowed to ask those questions.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Wouldn't it - - - wouldn't it have been - - it strikes me that would have been nice coming from the trial judge, but - - - but she didn't do that. She didn't - - - you know, she cut him off at every turn. And I didn't think it was a bad point to say I understand, you know, that the city paid 50,000 dollars for something involving this, and - - and we never - - the record doesn't clarify it for us because she says that - - - that's simply nothing that goes to the officer's credibility.

MS. CURRAN: Well, and I - - - I take issue with - - with what defense counsel argued earlier which is that the interpretation of this record means that the judge thought these allegations did not go to credibility.

JUDGE PIGOTT: No, my - - - my question to you was wouldn't it have been nice if the judge was making the arguments that you're now making, which

1 would have given the defense lawyer an opportunity to 2 address those things? 3 MS. CURRAN: Well, I'm not sure the judge needs to do the - - - the job of the defense attorney 4 5 for him. 6 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, you're not doing the job 7 of the defense attorney. You're doing the job, you know, of - - - of the judge here in saying this is -8 9 - - this was not made clear to her, and what I'm 10 suggest - - - suggesting is wouldn't it have been 11 nice if she had said you're not making it clear to 12 me? 13 MS. CURRAN: Okay. I do want to make 14 clear, though, that the credibility which he thought 15 wasn't going to the officer's credibility, was just the piece about the 50,000 dollars. It wasn't that 16 17 there could be specific allegations that might affect the officer's credibility. 18 19 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Curran, 20 notwithstanding the fact that your light is on, I'm 21 going to take a moment and ask you a question. You -22 - - with respect to the second trial - - -23 MS. CURRAN: Yes. 24 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - were these 25 issues raised at the second trial?

1	MS. CURRAN: No.
2	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Was it the same
3	judge?
4	MS. CURRAN: No.
5	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How does that impact
6	your argument here today, if it does at all?
7	MS. CURRAN: Well, it doesn't impact our
8	argument. It means that none of the defense
9	arguments are preserved for the second trial at all.
10	They never raised the proposed line of questioning
11	about civil lawsuits at the second trial. There's
12	nothing about federal documents at the fed at
13	the second trial. They argue that the court should
14	take judicial notice of the federal documents, but it
15	would be particularly unfair in this instance if the
16	court would do that because the court is asked to
17	decide whether the trial court exercised appropriate
18	discretion. And because the argument was never made
19	to the second judge and no federal documents were
20	ever shown to the second judge, that evaluation would
21	not be a fair evaluation.
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Ms.
23	Curran.
24	MS. CURRAN: Thank you very much.
25	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Flores.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Ms. Flores.

Τ	MS. FLORES: Just going back briefly to
2	Judge Rivera's question about whether what
3	would have happened if these lawsuits had a gag
4	order. In in that situation, there would have
5	been a countervailing State interest to think about,
6	to think about protecting someone's privacy, perhaps
7	or privacy of the officers or privacy of the
8	plaintiffs. And respondent talks about the
9	prejudicial versus probative analysis here, but we
10	really it it's not really appropriate in
11	this case, with respect to witnesses who are not the
12	defendant. There was no nothing to protect
13	here, no one's privacy. These are public lawsuits.
14	These are not, like, the police personnel records at
15	issue in Gibson (ph.)
16	JUDGE STEIN: But but isn't that
17	something that a judge has to consider in every
18	evidentiary ruling in a trial?
19	MS. FLORES: The prejudicial versus prob -
20	
21	JUDGE STEIN: Yeah.
22	MS. FLORES: Yes, and it comes into it, but
23	in a in a different context. Here what
24	JUDGE STEIN: Then it gets a little more
25	leeway.

1 MS. FLORES: Absolutely, and - - - and it's 2 a much more appropriate analysis when we're talking 3 about the prejudice to the defendant because the prejudice to the defendant is he could be improperly 4 5 convicted based on propensity evidence or something like that. But here, it's - - - it's hard to 6 7 articulate what would be the prejudice to these officers or to the People. 8 9 JUDGE STEIN: Well, confusing the jury and 10 11 MS. FLORES: Exactly. 12 JUDGE STEIN: Yeah. 13 MS. FLORES: And that is the appropriate analysis, Your Honor, that the court had the - - -14 15 the leeway to not confuse the jury, to not mislead 16 the jury, to not distract from the issues at hand. 17 But here credibility was a relevant issue. It was a main issue, and it was the centerpiece of defense 18 counsel's strategy. So - - -19 20 JUDGE RIVERA: What about the preservation 21 at the second trial? 22 MS. FLORES: So defense counsel was so shut 23 down at the first trial. He was told, essentially, 24 these are not legally relevant, these lawsuits. You

- - - it was not even a discretionary ruling. It was

a legal ruling, and so it would have been futile for 1 2 defense counsel to - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: But what's he got to lose, a 4 new judge, new judge, new day. 5 MS. FLORES: He may have asked again, and -6 7 JUDGE RIVERA: What's the point of a second trial if not a new - - - new opportunity? 8 9 MS. FLORES: Correct, and he - - - he did 10 have - - - he certainly could have asked. We're not 11 arguing that he couldn't have. But he - - - he 12 didn't need to - - - to preserve the issue for appeal 13 because he got a definitive legal ruling at the first 14 trial. He didn't have any new law to rely on at the 15 second trial that would have supported his argument the second time around. 16 17 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So how is a definitive legal ruling of relevance or not before a trial judge 18 19 who has one set of facts before her or him binding on 20 a - - - essentially, another judge of the same 21 accordant jurisdiction? I don't - - - I don't see 22 that, counsel. 23 MS. FLORES: Certainly, defense counsel 24 could have asked but he was - - - it - - - it was

made futile for him because he was told this is

1	legally irrelevant, this is not going to happen. And
2	he doesn't have an Appellate Division decision to
3	point to. He doesn't have anything else. He's had
4	one trial
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: Yeah, but you know you
6	know if you got a new trial, it's a it's a new
7	game. You can you can introduce the same
8	evidence, different evidence, anything.
9	MS. FLORES: Yes, and he certainly could
10	have asked, but he didn't, and all we're arguing is
11	that his request at the first trial was sufficient to
12	preserve it for appellate review at the second trial.
13	Thank you, Your Honor.
14	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. The next
15	matter is number 110, People v. Tyrell Ingram.
16	MS. MITSOGLOU: Good afternoon, Your
17	Honors; my name is Elsa Mitsoglou. I am from the
18	Cardozo Criminal Appeals Clinic, and I'm representing
19	the appellant, Tyrell Ingram, and I request two
20	minutes for rebuttal, please.
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have your two
22	minutes.
23	MS. MITSOGLOU: Thank you. So the issue in
24	this case, just like in the previous case of Charles
25	Smith, is the same, is whether the abuse

Smith, is the same, is whether the abuse - - -

whether the court abused its discretion by entirely prohibiting the defense from cross-examining key per - - - prosecution witnesses about their prior bad acts alleged in the federal civil rights lawsuit.

2.4

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And the question posed was?

MS. MITSOGLOU: The unfortunate first question posed was have you ever been sued, and as - - as we - - as Judge Rivera noted in the - - in the last case, it was only the start - - it was supposed to be only the start of the questioning. I - - and again, even though it was unfortunate, it was only the first question and as a way of laying foundation or showing the presence of good faith.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And how was the attorney prevented from - - - $\!\!\!\!$

MS. MITSOGLOU: The prosecution objected immediately to - - - to the question and then the court basically requested time to review case law and discuss it more. The - - - then the defense lawyer presented the case law which, by the way, was all about prior bad acts. It didn't - - - it was not just about the mere fact of the lawsuit or the mere fact of the existence of the lawsuit. It was of all the cases that she cited in her argument were about

1 prior bad acts. 2 JUDGE GARCIA: But did they make a proffer? 3 Did the defense counsel make a proffer of specific bad acts from these lawsuits that they wanted to ask 4 5 about? MS. MITSOGLOU: We - - - we say yes. 6 7 spec - - -JUDGE GARCIA: Where is that? 8 9 MS. MITSOGLOU: The specific bad acts were 10 the act on - - - where they - - - where the defense 11 counsel said that the - - - the victim who made the 12 lawsuit, Marcus Reyes, he was striking his body three 13 - - - into the - - - his back three times, was unnecessarily tightly handcuffed and strip searched. 14 15 So those - - - those are all specific acts. JUDGE GARCIA: So those were the acts that 16 17 they proffered and that we're reviewing for an abuse 18 of discretion that we're excluding? 19 MS. MITSOGLOU: Yes. JUDGE GARCIA: All on the excessive force 20 21 issue you just described? 22 MS. MITSOGLOU: Excessive force and, I mean, it - - - you know, it's not part of the record 23 24 because the - - - you know, the defense counsel 25 didn't continue speaking. He wasn't allowed to

1 continue speaking about the - - -2 JUDGE GARCIA: But the defense counsel here 3 had overnight to make this record, right? It isn't absolutely not and we have a page. It's come back 4 5 tomorrow with your cases. 6 MS. MITSOGLOU: Yes. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: So I - - - I think it's - -- I had a little trouble getting how he was cut off 8 9 from making that record. 10 MS. MITSOGLOU: Well, she wasn't cut - - -11 I - - - I didn't mean to suggest she was cut off from 12 - - - I mean she - - - she did make a record by 13 citing the four cases, that I just referred to, which were the - - - you know, the cases of People v. 14 15 Marzed, People v. Santos, People v. Gissendanner, and 16 I think the third one was People v. Hudy. And those 17 cases were all about the prior bad acts. So as far 18 as - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: But that - - - but that's 20 not usually enough, right, to get up and just say on 21 the strength of X case and not - - - not explain 22 exactly what - - - what your proffer is. 23 MS. MITSOGLOU: You're - - -2.4 JUDGE RIVERA: You're looking for an 25 objection, right?

1	MS. MITSOGLOU: You're totally right, Your
2	Honor. But she defense counsel did explain how
3	how the cases were important to her theory of
4	the case, that they they went to the to
5	the credibility of the cops. They then to her
6	also that they went to her theory of the case that
7	she
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Did she tie that
9	specifically to this case?
10	MS. MITSOGLOU: Yes, to to
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How did she do that?
12	MS. MITSOGLOU: She said that I think this
13	goes directly to my to my theor to the
14	theory of the case that they are rogue cops. And it
15	was that sentence was right
16	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: That's specific
17	enough that they are rogue cops?
18	MS. MITSOGLOU: Well, it it
19	especially tied with the read contextually with
20	also her saying that it went to the cred their
21	credibility. I yes, I would say so and then
22	also each explanation of each case and of how that
23	tied to both of those points.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. So let
25	just to clarify. You're not suggesting that the

1	allegations in the in the cases are the same
2	allegations that the defendant was making, or are
3	you, about about what is rogue about these
4	cops.
5	MS. MITSOGLOU: The allegations, you mean,
6	in the cases she cited or in the complaint that
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Both.
8	MS. MITSOGLOU: In the cases she cited, no.
9	She was only saying that look, here, these prior bad
10	acts were found out and these were good enough
11	good faith basis and they went to the credibility and
12	the credibility was a material issue and it was
13	allowed so we should do the same here. In terms of
14	the complaint, the acts alleged, the prior bad acts
15	alleged in the lawsuit against the police officers
16	were very similar to the ones that could have also
17	happened in in this case.
18	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And these all of
19	these police officers were involved in those
20	lawsuits?
21	MS. MITSOGLOU: All of them. All of them.
22	Yes, so and since since it was standard.
23	I mean this was a standard impeachment of
24	credibility. It was there was good there

was good faith basis in - - - given in the lawsuits

that are federal civil rights lawsuits that are attested to by the lawyer who is bound by ethical obligations not to lie, who is bound by legal obligations to not file frivolous lawsuits, to investigate and make sure there's reasonable basis to - - to file the lawsuits. So the - - there was good - - good faith basis in them. And, you know, even in comparison to People - - a case like People v. Alamo, the good faith basis there, we argue, is much less than the good faith basis found in these lawsuits.

So since it was standard impeachment, all credibility of key prosecution witnesses in a case where credibility was the key issue, there was nothing else tying the defendant-appellant Mr. Ingram to the - - - the gun, and it was - - - there was - - - there was nothing else except the testimony of those police officers. And defense counsel tried - - - attempted to question Sergeant Deevy, who was the main - - - the key prosecution witness, and I think Officer - - Officer Sanchez who also key prosecution witness for - - - for the story of the prosecution against Mr. Ingram. So since there was a good enough good faith basis, credibility was a key issue. These were key prosecution witnesses. They

Τ	are not defendant witnesses, so there was not the
2	extra protections that all of the the defendant
3	witnesses are supposed to get. There's there
4	shouldn't have been any basis to completely exclude
5	cross-examination into these into these acts.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Well well, if if
7	the cases are pending and they make some statement in
8	this lawsuit, aren't they perhaps prejudiced in those
9	other lawsuits I mean in excuse me, in -
LO	in the defendant's criminal case, aren't they
L1	perhaps prejudiced in their civil lawsuits?
L2	MS. MITSOGLOU: Can you in what way?
L3	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let let's say
L4	the judge lets lets defense counsel ask a
L5	series of questions. Is it is it possible that
L6	that officer, depending on the answer or a failure to
L7	answer, might, indeed, put him or herself in a less-
L8	than-positive position for the civil lawsuits, if
L9	they're pending?
20	MS. MITSOGLOU: I suppose so, yes. But
21	it's
22	JUDGE RIVERA: And if so, is that a factor
23	for the judge to consider in determining whether or
24	not to permit the questioning?

MS. MITSOGLOU: Absolutely, but to permit

the questioning entirely or to permit the 1 questioning, the - - - to limit the - - - you know, 2 3 the nature and the extent of the cross-examination? 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Because if your question is 5 basically reading the allegation in the lawsuit, which if there's been an answer, the officer's 6 7 counsel would have already presumably denied or 8 there's some explanation anyway, if, indeed, an 9 answer aligns with any statement that's already been 10 made in the civil lawsuit, I - - - I get your point. 11 But I quess where - - - what - - - what I'm asking is 12 let's assume there is some line of questioning that 13 is permissible. That there would be a rule crafted, 14 potentially, that permits this line of questioning. 15 Is - - - is it an appropriate factor under such - - -16 potentially such a rule, as you have suggested, where 17 a court should also consider the potential adverse consequences or impact on the officer, the witness 18 19 who's testifying as a defendant in this lawsuit? 20 You're arguing the witness is not a defendant, so 21 there's nothing prejudicial that would befall that 22 witness in being asked these questions.

JUDGE RIVERA: But they're not - - right,

MS. MITSOGLOU: Well, I am arguing about

23

24

that - -

they're not the defendant in a criminal prosecution. 1 MS. MITSOGLOU: Exactly, and certainly not 2 3 in this criminal prosecution. And again, if this - -4 - the - - - you know, the balance, if you consider 5 the balance or the factor affecting the police officer in this - - - in his civil rights lawsuit 6 7 versus the freedom of the defendant in this criminal action, then, I mean, still the balance - - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, no, he knows it might 10 inculpate him, right, depending - - - or her, 11 depending on the conduct in a criminal act; is that 12 not possible? 13 MS. MITSOGLOU: I'm sorry; say that again? JUDGE RIVERA: In a criminal act is that 14 15 not possible? The officer may have done something 16 that's alleged in that civil action that has - - -17 MS. MITSOGLOU: That's - - -JUDGE RIVERA: - - - possibility of 18 19 suggesting there's criminal actions involved? 20 MS. MITSOGLOU: Yes, that could be the case 21 but - - - but still, I think, as my revered counsel Flores suggested is that there - - - the jury should 22 23 -- - it would still be useful to the jury to observe 24 the demeanor of the police officer being asked, at 25 least, a or two questions about it.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
2	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
3	MS. MITSOGLOU: Thank you.
4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel.
5	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Good afternoon; may it
6	please the court, Raffaelina Gianfrancesco on behalf
7	of James A. McCarty, appointed special acting
8	district attorney for Bronx County in this matter.
9	Although provided ample opportunity to do so, defense
10	counsel failed to suggest to the trial court in this
11	case that she wished to ask the police officers about
12	any facts, and and specifically any facts that
13	alleged, with regard to these officers, in the
14	underlying lawsuit.
15	JUDGE PIGOTT: If she had, would they have
16	been admissible then?
17	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Excuse me, Your Honor?
18	JUDGE PIGOTT: If she had done what you had
19	just said she failed to do, would that evidence then
20	be admissible?
21	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: If she had done that
22	then she she would have laid the good faith
23	basis in a reasonable basis in fact. And then
24	JUDGE STEIN: When she asked whether the -
25	or she said that the lawsuit was evidence of

- of prior bad acts. Can't we infer that she was going to ask about those acts?

2.4

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Absolutely not, Your Honor. I know defense counsel suggests that by presenting the court with cases that weren't actually even on point with regard to this issue that the inference was there. This record fully supports the Appellate Division's decision that the defense counsel never asked, though given plenty of opportunity. The prosecutor several times in this case when they were discussing - - when she sua sponte started asking that question and it was immediately objected to and sustained, the prosecutor says the fact of being sued is not permissible impeachment material.

JUDGE PIGOTT: I disagree. I think that's funny that we - - - we've said that several times now. Now if there's a good faith basis, if somebody's been sued, and - - - and they settled the case admitting that they were wrong, there's nothing wrong with asking have you been sued, because the next thing coming up is yes, and then you can get into the facts. So that, you know, this isn't some big red light in courts that say, you know, you can never ask if anybody's been sued. So I'm not sure -

Т	I'm not sure that's the the appropriate
2	approach here. And what I asked you before and I was
3	asking I was wondering if you could tell me,
4	are there circumstances under which prior police bad
5	acts can be introduced in a case, such as these, to
6	impeach the the testimony of a of an
7	arresting officer?
8	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes, Judge Pigott.
9	JUDGE PIGOTT: And and what would
10	those and what would, in your view, be the
11	foundation upon which you could do that?
12	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Okay, I know you're
13	using the word foundation to lay that for the
14	evidentiary admissibility of that, but if we're
15	looking at it in terms of what is the standard here
16	for anyone, either a prosecutor or a defense counsel
17	to impeach a witness, it is is there a good faith
18	basis and a reasonable basis in fact. So where do we
19	look at first? We look at what is the source of
20	information.
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no. Let's keep
22	going. You said, all right, there has to be a good
23	faith basis.
24	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct. So

JUDGE PIGOTT: All right. So let's assume

they have a good faith basis. What's next?

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Okay. So they have a good faith basis. Then we go to the next step, and we have the trial court weigh what those questions are or what are - - -

JUDGE PIGOTT: Why, why, why?

MS. MITSOGLOU: - - - the underlying - - - JUDGE PIGOTT: I mean I've got a good faith basis. I say you've been sued, the - - - the People object, overruled. And - - - because as a judge, I - - I've got a good faith basis for this. The next question is answer that question. Yes, I have. All right, and were you sued for police brutality on - - - you know, on a certain date? No. End of inquiry. Yes, I was. Tell us about it. It's a false accusation. It was made against me because of this, that, and the other thing. Let's move on. But the idea that you can't even get there is what troubles me.

MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Okay. Judge, well, I would equate that to the question of have you, in fact, been sued is similar to the question have you ever been arrested or und - - are you under indictment. This court has not allowed those questions. In People v. Miller this court has said

1 you cannot ask someone if they've been arrested. 2 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Can you go right to 3 the underlying acts? MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Exactly, if you lay 4 5 that good faith basis, Your Honor. 6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What's the good faith 7 basis? How do you get there? MS. GIANFRANCESCO: The good faith basis is 8 9 do you have a reliable source of information. And 10 this court held in - - -11 JUDGE FAHEY: But - - - but wait a minute. 12 You're outside the presence of the jury. Forget 13 about the inartful question have you ever been sued because you're - - - I - - - I agree with you there. 14 15 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right. JUDGE FAHEY: It's - - - it's an artful 16 17 question. I think even the opposing side would agree with that. But nonetheless, you come into court, you 18 19 have - - - you have papers that say Officer X is 20 being sued, with a series of factual allegations 21 against a series of officers. The judge says do you 22 have a good faith basis? Yes, I do, Your Honor. I 23 have all the papers here that - - - that make allegations against him. I want to ask him about 24

those allegations. Now whether the question's

1	phrased can you be sued or not, isn't the mere
2	production of the documents sufficient, not to
3	establish a foundation, but to establish a good faith
4	basis for your questions in cross-examination?
5	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Your Honor, I would put
6	it as a two-prong requirement.
7	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
8	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: It is where's your
9	source of information, so I'm coming in with this
10	_
11	JUDGE FAHEY: All right, I say I tell
12	you.
13	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I'm coming in
14	yeah.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: No, slow down. So I tell
16	you, it's right here, Judge.
17	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Okay.
18	JUDGE FAHEY: It's this federal number,
19	whatever. You can get them off the Internet. We all
20	can.
21	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Which right.
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Yeah, right.
23	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Which is I
24	presume is what happened in this case even though
25	defense counsel doesn't even note to the court that

she has this information from PACER or actually even 1 has the lawsuit with her. So she brings in the 2 3 lawsuit but then you have to ask the next question. What are the specific bad acts that you now allege -4 5 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, all right. Now let's 6 7 take - - - let's take that. What you're saying is 8 you have to vet each question, it sounds like to me, 9 in cross-examination, and I don't think that's ever 10 been the rule on cross-examination that you have to 11 vet each question ahead of time before you can ask There are rare circumstances where it does 12 13 happen, but specifically, is vetting of questions - -14 - of course, if I'm the People in this instance, I would always want that because then I have heard the 15 16 question ahead of time and the answers can then be 17 anticipated for the witness - - -18 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct. JUDGE FAHEY: - - - or the people out 19 20 there. But that totally undermines the purpose of 21 cross-examination, totally under - - -22 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I agree with that. 23 JUDGE FAHEY: Your proposed rule totally 2.4 undermines the purpose of cross-examination. It

creates a situation where cross-examination is - - -

1 is effectively negated. Its effectiveness is - - -2 is destroyed. MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I understand - - - I 3 understand what's troubling you, Judge. That - - -4 5 right, there is no rule. We're not req - - requiring a motion in limine for the defense in order 6 7 to ask these questions. However, when you're 8 approaching it the way the defense attorney did in 9 this case and the question is have you ever been 10 sued, of course that's going to prompt an objection 11 by the People and a sidebar. 12 JUDGE FAHEY: Per - - - perhaps a 13 justifiable objection. 14 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: So - - - correct. 15 JUDGE FAHEY: Right? MS. GIANFRANCESCO: So and - - - and I 16 think this was - - - the court properly sustained the 17 objection in this case. 18 19 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: So, Counsel, could - -20 - assuming the - - - the judge wouldn't allow the 21 questions but the trial went on, and then defense 22 counsel, without doing the vetting, asked a specific 23 question about misconduct, so you're saying the judge 2.4 might not have allowed that question because it

wasn't vetted by, you know, saying I have a good

1	faith basis?
2	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No.
3	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I'm sure that the
4	prosecution would have objected.
5	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct, yeah.
6	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: And then defense
7	counsel would have said here's my good faith basis.
8	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct. Right.
9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: I have these lawsuits
10	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes.
11	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Right. So
12	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Judge, and I think
13	that's the way it would have been handled. I
14	what I'm trying to say is that it's not that the
15	question can't be asked. It's not that the defense
16	counsel must come to the court. Though, in the other
17	two cases, there was opportunity for all the parties
18	to engage in this conversation with regard to what
19	the allegations are and where they're coming from.
20	That's never been a requirement for cross-
21	examination. How
22	JUDGE PIGOTT: So what would you think is
23	the rule? I think you agree that under certain
24	circumstances a police officer can be cross-examined

like any other witness, including prior bad acts.

1 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Absolutely. 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: Okay. What's the rule that 3 you would apply in these cases? MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I would apply the rule 4 5 that has always been applied, that seems to always been applied by all Fourth Departments in this court, 6 7 have you presented a good faith basis and a reasonable basis in fact, and are you requesting to 8 9 ask questions with regard to specific allegations 10 which would allow the jury to make a determination 11 with regard to this witness's credibility. And 12 that's not what occurred in this case. Defense 13 counsel, when they were vetting this after the objection was made, was given every opportunity to 14 15 present what she would have believed to have been 16 specific prior bad acts committed by - - - who - - -17 Detective Sanchez who was on the stand at the time. The only thing that she told the court was that this 18 19 lawsuit is indication of a prior bad act. It's not. 20 We know that. The same way an arrest or an 21 indictment is not indication of - - -22 JUDGE PIGOTT: How - - - how do we know 23 that? 2.4 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Because the courts have

The mere fact that you've been arrested or

25

told us.

under indictment - - -1 2 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no, no. No, I 3 understand that. I'm - - - I'm still not giving up on you can ask if somebody's been sued. But the fact 4 5 of the matter, let's assume for a minute that - - that he bopped, you know, somebody over the head and 6 7 he got sued for it. Have you been sued? Yes. And 8 isn't it a fact that you were sued because you bopped 9 somebody over the head? Yes. Did you bop somebody 10 over the head? No. 11 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: I understand you're 12 troubled by the question of have you been sued but 13 that is not what the - - -14 JUDGE PIGOTT: No, no. I'm not. I'm not. 15 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right. Okay. JUDGE PIGOTT: I just want to get rid of 16 17 that. 18 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right. 19 JUDGE PIGOTT: Here's my point. You have -20 - - you have a right as a prosecutor to say if the 21 defendant takes the stand I can ask him about prior 22 bad acts and I intend to. Can the Peop - - - can the 23 defense do the same thing? 2.4 MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No. The defense

actually - - - the prosecutor has a higher burden.

1	We have to have a Sandoval ruling. We have to
2	inquire
3	JUDGE PIGOTT: Ventimiglia.
4	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: beforehand.
5	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not
6	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: The defense
7	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm not suggesting Sandoval.
8	I'm suggesting Ventimiglia.
9	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Oh
10	JUDGE PIGOTT: I'm I'm saying that if
11	you've got prior bad acts of the defense, you can
12	- you can of the defendant you can question him
13	about that. Now the judge may want to know what they
14	are, you know.
15	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right.
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: But I think the same thing
17	here. Can you say I'm going to I'm going to -
18	I fully intend to ask him about the fact that
19	he's been sued in federal court fifteen times.
20	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: But not the fact that
21	you've just been sued, Judge. The you have to
22	also look at the specific bad acts because what
23	you're asking a jury
24	JUDGE PIGOTT: But do you understand what
25	I'm saying?

Т	MS. GLANFRANCESCO: UM-NUM.
2	JUDGE PIGOTT: The answer to that is of
3	course. But you can't say you can't ask if he's been
4	sued because if you can't ask that, then how are you
5	going to get over here. I'm saying everybody says,
6	oh, you know, you can say have you been sued. You've
7	got to have a good faith basis to ask that. And the
8	answer has got to be yes. You can't say have you
9	been sued and and not know the answer. So then
10	you and then you go into what you're what
11	you now want to say
12	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right.
13	JUDGE PIGOTT: and you have to get
14	specific.
15	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right.
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: I guess that's all I'm
17	trying to say.
18	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Okay. That's fine.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, in in the
20	mechanics
21	JUDGE PIGOTT: We're at peace.
22	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Okay.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. In the
24	mechanics, is it
25	MS GIANFRANCESCO: IIm-hiim

1	JUDGE RIVERA: what you're saying
2	that the first question is not have you been sued but
3	you've got to get to the facts.
4	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: I mean you or another
6	prosecutor stands up and says I object.
7	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: That at that point, if
9	if
10	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: defense counsel hasn't
12	already done it
13	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: has to then say this
15	is my source. So now let's get to the real point
16	- here. So the my source
17	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Um-hum.
18	JUDGE RIVERA: do you agree that an
19	existing or prior lawsuit can be a good can
20	provide a good faith basis
21	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct, yes.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: for these questions?
23	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Yes. Yes.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: So you don't object to the
25	fact that the source is a lawsuit?

1	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: No. No. It is the
2	- that's a fine source. If it's a lawsuit that's
3	been filed, then you have to go
4	JUDGE RIVERA: What if what if it's
5	been settled?
6	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Well, in in the -
7	if it's been settled, I would say that's
8	something that the court could look at. Depends on
9	is it settled is it dismissed, is it dismissed
LO	on the merits, have there been no admissions of guilt
L1	by the defen by the officers.
L2	JUDGE RIVERA: You're more likely than not
L3	going to get that in a settlement, but there's no
L4	admissions of guilt, how is that any different from
L5	it's a pending lawsuit and we haven't worked out
L6	_
L7	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Well
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: we haven't yet figured
L9	out whether or not, in fact I won't say guilt,
20	liability, right
21	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Correct. Right.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: the the
23	defendant is liable.
24	MS. GIANFRANCESCO: Right. I I think
25	it's just one thing that I would assume that if it -

- - if it's for the prosecutor, in their respect, they're going to raise it to the court. I think it's just part of the - - - the whole question of whether or not the - - - the cross-examination. But in this case, it's clear on this record that the defendant was never precluded from asking about the underlying facts. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you. Counsel.

MS. MITSOGLOU: I would just like to address the - - - the argument that there was no good faith basis because of this - - - the lack of specific factual allegations, as Judge Garcia asked before. This is on - - - on page 12 of our opening brief and onwards. We cite the entirety of the record where - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Are those allegations, though, against this Detective Sanchez? I mean he's - - - the - - - the proffer is that there were these - - - this excessive force used to show there were rogue cops. But is there any indication that the specific allegations here go to the - - - actually the witness who's actually testifying?

MS. MITSOGLOU: Well, I - - - our argument for that would be that, again, like Judge Pigott suggested, you could still just ask about them and

that he can - - - their witness can try to - - - you know, can answer and specify, no, I wasn't involved.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But then what's your good -- - then I think you've got a good faith basis problem. Like, to go to Judge Rivera's point, let's say you have a gun case, right, and there's a - - there's a gun on the floor, they arrest somebody, it's dismissed, that defendant brings a future civil rights suit. Same cop arrests a defendant, gun possession, similar circumstances. You want to come in and you want to say did you arrest so-and-so. You know, didn't you claim there was a gun on the floor? Wasn't that - - - an objection, good faith basis, there's this lawsuit. I think we all agree that's fine. But what you're doing here is saying there's a general lawsuit, I guess against the group, there's some excessive force allegation. But you've got one detective on the stand you want to cross about that. So where is your good faith basis for asking this witness did you strike someone in the back, did you strike him in the body. I mean putting aside the relevance of the issues in this case.

MS. MITSOGLOU: Well, I - - - I mean I - - we don't see any difference between the - - - the scenario that you just described and what happened

1 here. I mean you could have one police officer 2 committing bad acts on his own and you could have 3 eight police officers committing bad acts as a group. And two of them could be beating, two of them could 4 5 be watching, two of them could be lying. It's not -- - I mean, and all of these bad acts individually 6 7 and together are prior bad acts together. And in 8 People v. Alamo, for example, the good faith basis 9 there was it was just merely the information that was 10 given to the prosecution by a police officer that the 11 defendant was merely in the room with two other 12 people and some keys from stolen taxis. I don't see 13 how - - - we don't see how that's less - - - you 14 know, or more - - - more good faith basis than the 15 one that exists here. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. Are you - - -17 are you saying given the nature of the work of an 18 officer that even not acting when there is certain 19 bad conduct by a group of officers is enough to ask 20 about? 21 MS. MITSOGLOU: I - - - I - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Of course, I'm observing the 23 other officers beat up someone.

MS. MITSOGLOU: And I do not - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: And I'm an officer, I do

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1 nothing, and I don't report it later. MS. MITSOGLOU: Yes, I would - - - we would 2 3 consider that that as a prior bad act. JUDGE GARCIA: But would you then consider 4 5 that person watching a rogue cop? MS. MITSOGLOU: Well, if you - - - if part 6 7 of your not being a rogue cop is reporting other 8 rogue cops, then not doing so is being a rogue cop. 9 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 10 MS. MITSOGLOU: Thank you. 11 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Next is 111, People 12 v. Isma McGhee. 13 MR. ZENO: Good afternoon; Mark Zeno for 14 Appellant Isma McGhee. I'd like to reserve two 15 minutes for rebuttal. CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Certainly, sir. 16 17 MR. ZENO: What distinguishes this case 18 from the prior two is the state of counsel's 19 application. Counsel specifically did not want to ask about the fact that a lawsuit was filed or a 20 21 lawsuit was settled. He wanted to ask about the 22 underlying facts of the lawsuit themselves. He 23 wanted to ask the right question, where you involved 2.4 in false arrests and - - - and the facts underlying

those false arrests. The court found that that was

irrelevant. The court found that the defense counsel 1 had established a good faith basis for those 2 3 questions but that they were irrelevant. JUDGE STEIN: Well, is - - - isn't there 4 5 another distinction here, which is a little bit more problematic, which is that the witness in question 6 7 was not the person that had conducted the - - - the 8 arrest or the buys or anything? It was somebody who 9 was supervising other judges - - - other police. 10 MR. ZENO: Well, he - - -11 JUDGE STEIN: Other police. 12 MR. ZENO: They did present Detective 13 Rivera as the supervising officer of the - - - of the 14 operation at the Lincoln Houses. They chose to 15 present him not only as the supervising officer, but 16 as the officer through whom they explained their 17 case. He was the lead detective in the case. He was the most important witness. There were other 18 19 witnesses who - - - how performed the underlying 20 buys, but he was the - - - the lead detective. 21 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But does it really 22 matter - - -23 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What were the 2.4 specific allegations that - - - that were to be

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raised?

MR. ZENO: Well, there were two - - - there were - - - counsel said that there were three lawsuits that he wanted to ask about, two of which had been settled, one for 75,000, I think, and one for 20,000. And he wanted to ask about the underlying facts of those lawsuits.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: But does it matter

that Detective Rivera was not one of the people buy
- involved in the buy and bust but was supervising

the operation? Does that - - -

MR. ZENO: No, it doesn't matter. Perhaps in terms of harm, it might have - - - it might - - - might matter, whether it was harmless error to have precluded the questioning. But it certainly didn't matter in terms of the defendant's right to impeach him. The defendant has a right to impeach adverse witnesses. The confrontation clause guarantees him that right. He has the right to - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But there has to be a probative value to - - - you know, to it. And - - - and the - - - the court gets to weigh how removed it is from what this particular witness meant in this particular case, so doesn't - - - doesn't the court have some leeway there?

MR. ZENO: The court - - - the court does

have some leeway. That's not the basis on which the 1 2 court precluded the questioning here. The court 3 found it was irrelevant, it didn't - - - it didn't find, as a matter of discretion, that the questioning 4 5 shouldn't happen because he was only a secondary I would say that that's - - -6 witness. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what - - - why isn't that subsumed under it's irrelevant? 8 9 MR. ZENO: Its relevance is a legal 10 determination. It's not - - - the - - - if something 11 is relevant, it is admissible unless there's an exclusionary rule to preclude it. Once it's found to 12 13 be relevant, then the court has to weigh prejudice versus probative value. But the court never got 14 15 there. The court found here that it was irrelevant 16 because the allegations hadn't been proven yet; that 17 the lawsuit alone wasn't enough to establish its relevance, and that's clearly not the case. The 18 19 lawsuit didn't have to be proven. Didn't - - - the defendant didn't have to win the lawsuit - - - well -20 21 22 JUDGE RIVERA: Let - - - let's say we were 23 to agree with you. Why isn't it harmless?

MR. ZENO: Why isn't it harmless? Getting

back to, again, the People chose to present Detective

2.4

1 Rivera as the lead witness. He was the narrator of 2 the People's case. If the defendant had been able to 3 establish that he was a liar, that his testimony shouldn't bel - - - be believed, then - - - then the 4 5 jury might well have disregarded all the testimony. 6 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: There was - - -7 MR. ZENO: He was supervising the 8 operation. 9 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Yeah, but, okay, maybe 10 that's true, but there were several buys here made by different undercover officers who testified to those 11 12 direct buys. So assuming Detective Rivera was the 13 supervisor and he laid out, you know, what the overall operation was, I - - - don't you still have 14 15 overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt of the 16 buys - - -17 MR. ZENO: No. 18 JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: - - - through the - -19 - through the undercover detectives who actually 20 participated in them? 21 MR. ZENO: No, notwithstanding the fact 22 that there were, I think, ten alleged buys, there was 23 no buy money recovered, there were no audio tapes, 24 videotapes, fingerprints. They - - - they executed a

search warrant in my client's apartment. There was

1 nothing there to suggest he was involved in drug 2 dealing. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: That's a significant leap that - - - that you're making there that a jury, if -4 5 - - if it were to agree that - - - or conclude that Rivera is just not trustworthy given - - - given the 6 7 lawsuits, that therefore every other officer who gets 8 up is not trustworthy. MR. ZENO: Well, the - - - the question is 9 10 under Crimmins is there a - - - assuming there's a -11 - - even if there's overwhelming evidence, you have to go to the next step. If - - - if the questioning 12 13 had been allowed and the defense had been successful in establishing that - - - that Officer Rivera was 14 15 not credible, would that have affected the verdict? 16 Is there a reasonable possibility that it affected 17 the verdict? And if the People's lead witness is - -- is attacked and proven to be a liar, I - - - I say 18 19 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Did they call him the lead 21 witness? 22 MR. ZENO: Did they call him the lead 23 witness? JUDGE RIVERA: Did they present him as the 24

case turns on this person?

MR. ZENO: No. They did not use tho - - - those are my words, Your Honor. He was - - - but he was the narrator of the People's case. He was - - - collected all of the evidence, he supervised the evidence as the buy operation unfolded, and he presented the case to the jury. He was the person through whom the case was comprised. So there's just - - if he had been shown to be incredible, there's no way a jury would have disregarded that and found the People had proven their case.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Mr. Zeno, you've raised a second issue, I believe, on the propriety of the defendant's sentence. You want to spend a little bit of time with that?

MR. ZENO: Sure, Your Honor. The defendant was sentenced as a second felony drug offender whose prior conviction was a violent felony on the basis of a third degree criminal possession of a weapon conviction. The statute, 70.70 and 70.02, at the time that the defendant committed the - - - this crime, did not list CPW 3 under subdivision 4 as a - - - as a violent felony, and for that reason, it did not give the defendant fair notice of the - - - of the penalty that he would face. If the defendant looked at the statutes at the time he was - - he

1	was committed this crime and wanted to
2	determine the sentence he would receive, he would not
3	have found under 70.02 the conviction under CPW 3(4),
4	and and it would be unfair to to sentence
5	him to a sentence which he did not receive fair
6	notice of.
7	JUDGE FAHEY: There was also the question
8	of the photo array?
9	MR. ZENO: That's right, Your Honor. The
10	photo array, which step taking a step back, the
11	officer who viewed the photo array two months after
12	the crime had provided a description of the
13	perpetrator as having one eye that's kind of off.
14	JUDGE STEIN: I I looked at that
15	photo array.
16	MR. ZENO: Um-hum.
17	JUDGE STEIN: And as far and I can't
18	really even see his I mean there's nothing that
19	stands out to me about his eye. I mean maybe he's
20	looking in a slightly different direction or
21	something, but I I just I'm not sure
22	_
23	JUDGE FAHEY: It doesn't doesn't
24	appear to be exaggerated. I agree with the judge. I
25	looked at it too.

JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, I'm - - - I'm not sure 1 2 what makes it suggestive. 3 MR. ZENO: Well, what makes it suggestive is, again, if you look - - - it's - - - if you look 4 5 at the photo, there are five men who are staring directly at the camera and there's one who's loo - -6 7 - looking off up to the right, I believe. JUDGE STEIN: Yeah, maybe a little bit. 8 9 Yeah. 10 MR. ZENO: With one eye looking even more -11 - - more further to the right. JUDGE FAHEY: You know, it's - - it's - -12 13 - looking at the photo array made me think of how 14 would one identify Mike Tyson, somebody with a facial 15 tattoo, say, that kind of situation. And - - - and 16 it doesn't seem like there's a practical way to cover 17 up - - - part of somebody's tattoo and still go 18 through a normal identifying process. I suppose 19 twenty years from now, when tattoos - - - when judges 20 all have tattoos, it will be more of a common 21 problem. But at this point in our jurisprudence, we 22 haven't reached that level, thank god, yet. So - - but it - - - it will be a - - - become a problem I 23 24 think where facial identifying characteristics will

not be able to be covered up or be made so

1	standardized. But in this point, I it's
2	I'm not sure how you say the the medical
3	condition strabismus? Is is that it? Do you
4	know what
5	MR. ZENO: Can you repeat that?
6	JUDGE FAHEY: Strabismus? Is that is
7	that the medical condition that he has?
8	MR. ZENO: I'm not sure.
9	JUDGE FAHEY: Anyway
10	MR. ZENO: I would it would call it a
11	walleye.
12	JUDGE FAHEY: I see.
13	MR. ZENO: I think that a I see my
14	time is up but just
15	JUDGE FAHEY: Go ahead.
16	MR. ZENO: two quick reactions to
17	that, Your Honor. One, I think you have to look at
18	the fact that the witness identified the perpetrator
19	in their description, one eye that's kind of off.
20	JUDGE FAHEY: Um-hum.
21	MR. ZENO: So there were five people who
22	unquestionably unquestionably in the array did
23	not have one eye that's kind of off.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So what efforts do
25	the police or prosecutor have to make under those

1	circumstances?
2	MR. ZENO: Well, it's a photo it's a
3	photo array, Your
4	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Everyone has to have
5	an off eye?
6	MR. ZENO: Not at all. It's a photo array
7	Your Honor. They could have just put a piece of
8	paper over the over the offending eye in each
9	of the on each of the photos in the array, and
10	that would have eliminated the suggestiveness, very
11	simple.
12	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
13	MR. ZENO: Thanks.
14	MS. WERTHEIMER: Good afternoon, Your
15	Honors; my name is Sylvia Wertheimer. I represent
16	the People. I'd like to focus on the fact that the
17	the proffer here was really very general. The
18	problem in this case
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, just to go to the
20	proffer, and we've been talking a lot about what
21	specific proffers were made. And I think this case
22	is somewhat different in that defense counsel here

showed a good faith basis for why they wanted to ask

this, the lawsuits, but then pointed to specific acts

lthey wanted to ask about in saying, look, I

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understand the suit itself would be irrelevant, but
that gives me good faith basis to ask if he
participated in some of the acts that allegedly would
fall under the bad and malicious acts. Why doesn't
that get to you these bad acts which then there is
some proffer as to what they would be?

MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, I would submit that there is no proffer as to what the bad acts would be. I think a key point is that - - - that the federal lawsuits alleged group misconduct, and the rationale behind bad act impeachment is that the bad act has to be probative, intend to show that the witness with - - is untrustworthy or willing to put his own interests above the interests of others. It's not enough to just say it's a bad act.

JUDGE GARCIA: He says it's false arrest, didn't he?

MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, a false arrest is not nec - - - first of all, the question didn't necessarily - - - in terms he said did you want to arrest people who committed - - - were you involved in the arrest of people who committed no crimes.

That doesn't necessarily even mean there wasn't probable cause. But even if there was - - - or contemplating an arrest without probable cause, being

involved, what does that mean? As Justice Rivera said, what if he just was watching somebody else arrest? It matters what this particular police officer - - -

mean the questions he wants to ask are, "So I was going to ask him if he's aware of being involved in the arrest of" so-and-so, this plaintiff. "If such an arrest took place on the dates that were alleged, and is it, in fact, that those plaintiffs committed no crimes and he participated in a false arrest?"

Why doesn't that give you the basis to ask that question?

MS. WERTHEIMER: That - - - because that doesn't show that this particular detective, the witness on the stand, did anything wrong. It involved an allegation of a group of officers - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Who made a false arrest.

MS. WERTHEIMER: A group of officer - - - who arrested somebody who didn't commit a crime. Now if you arrest somebody without probable cause, first of all, you don't know what this particular def - - - detective's role was. The - - - the lawsuits were not made part of the record, but I believe in one of the case, for example, one of the officers just swore

1	out a complaint based on what the other officers who
2	were on the scene said to him. Would that be a bad
3	act by this officer? We submit it wouldn't be.
4	Probable cause is a very complicated concept. Police
5	officers can make mistakes. Simply arresting
6	somebody without probable cause does not mean
7	is not does not tend to show that
8	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Counsel counsel,
9	are we are we
LO	MS. WERTHEIMER: the detective is
L1	untrustworthy.
L2	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Excuse me, counsel.
L3	Are we slicing this issue of bad acts and and
L4	moral conduct or are these very thin because these
L5	are police officers, or wouldn't this be the case
L6	with any other witness that people make mistakes and
L7	they do things that they can explain
L8	MS. WERTHEIMER: If
L9	JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: if they're asked
20	about?
21	MS. WERTHEIMER: Okay. But but we
22	submit that it's not a different rule for police
23	officers, because you couldn't ask a witness about
24	something that they did as a group. I mean would you
25	he able to ask a witness, a defendant or any other

1 witness, were you present at a club when the group of 2 people you were with fired shots at somebody else? 3 Wouldn't you have to first have a basis that this particular witness fired some shots and was involved? 4 5 The fact that he was just part of the group, that wouldn't indicate - - - wouldn't be a proper basis 6 7 for this particular witness having committed a bad act. In addition, it certainly goes - - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but that might be 10 the first question leading to the questions that are connected to that bad act. Is - - - is defense 11 12 counsel not able to do that? 13 MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, the defense counsel could have made a proffer as to what this particular 14 15 officer did. He chose not to do so. I submit it 16 seems - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel, the underlying cases - - - if the criminal case is 18 19 dismissed that's forming the basis of these 20 allegations? 21 MS. WERTHEIMER: Yes. They - - - they were 22 dismissed. They were - - - I think they were quickly 23 dismissed. None of this is in the record, by the

25 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So let me ask you a

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way.

Τ	question. How would defense counsel get to any
2	possible specific acts? Would they have access to
3	the case file from the underlying criminal case?
4	Would they access to the personnel file of the police
5	officer who may have been involved in the false
6	arrests?
7	MS. WERTHEIMER: No, I I believe what
8	they would have access to is documents relating to
9	the federal lawsuit. They could call up the defense
10	the attorney who represents the plaintiff in
11	the federal lawsuit and say get more information.
12	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: How about the case
13	file, the criminal case file?
14	MS. WERTHEIMER: No, I don't think you
15	would have access to the criminal case file, but this
16	is based on the allegations from the federal lawsuit.
17	So you could call up the lawyer who is representing
18	the plaintiff in a federal lawsuit and say what did
19	this particular witness supposedly do. And
20	JUDGE RIVERA: But if he knew, he would
21	have put it in the lawsuit, right?
22	MS. WERTHEIMER: Excuse me?
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Well well, if he knew,
24	he would have put it in the complaint?
25	MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, not necessarily, and

1	we don't even know in
2	JUDGE RIVERA: So he might not be as
3	generous
4	MS. WERTHEIMER: We don't even know in this
5	case I I believe that, you know, the
6	defense counsel here could have been particularly
7	vague and
8	JUDGE STEIN: Well, wouldn't you be
9	arguing, too, that it wasn't a good faith basis, so -
10	so counsel for the plaintiff told you that this
11	is it? I mean it's not in a pleading it's a proffer.
12	MS. WERTHEIMER: Not if
13	JUDGE STEIN: How how would that
14	_
15	MS. WERTHEIMER: I don't think so. We
16	would if it was based on the counsel, these are
17	the allegations underlying federal false arrest
18	allegations in a in a lawsuit. But certainly,
19	also it goes to the exercise
20	JUDGE RIVERA: I don't want to stay on that
21	argument. Look, I I'm an attorney; I represent
22	someone who claims that an officer committed a bad
23	act that violated my civil rights. The attorney does
24	research, decides yes, there's a callable claim,
25	files it, sets up the allegations to survive the

motion to dismiss or not. Why isn't that enough?

I've set out in this thing that this group or this individual did not follow the - - - the duties of an officer.

MS. WERTHEIMER: So we submit - - - we submit that the key point is whether there's a showing of specific factual wrongdoing by this particular officer. And just to say were you involved in a false arrest is not necessarily relevant of credibility.

JUDGE GARCIA: But that's not what the judge ruled. I mean that would be an interesting ruling, but the court ruled, I - - - "I know you say as part of your defense, I suppose, that he was falsely arrested. But how is the relevance of another case claiming false arrest after against this police officer a viable question, really? Nothing has been proven that he indeed falsely arrested someone." That seems like the wrong standard for evaluating whether or not you can ask the question.

MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, I don't - - - number one, I don't think the nothing has been proven is the sole basis of - - - that was one of the things that the court said. The court is thinking, you know - - - in response. I think the first part is that how it

1 is it - - -2 JUDGE GARCIA: The courts were bound by the 3 proffer. Aren't we bound by the ruling? MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, the - - - the 4 5 proffer is - - - is how - - - yeah, and the ruling was how is it relevant. And it's not relevant unless 6 7 you show that there's something that indicates that this - - - that the conduct that this particular 8 9 officer committed in this situation tends to show he 10 was untrustworthy. What if he was just standing 11 there? This is - - -JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so, counsel, let's 12 13 say we don't agree with your interpretation of this record and Judge Garcia wins the day in his 14 15 interpretation of the record. Is it enough then? 16 Did the judge make an error? If that's - - - if 17 that's the correct interpretation, that the judge based this on - - -18 19 MS. WERTHEIMER: No, because of the - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - mere allegations and a 21 civil rights lawsuit is not enough? 22 MS. WERTHEIMER: No. The judge - - - the 23 judge went further and exercised the discretion. 24 - - - the colloquy continued after the judge made the

comment how is it relevant, and the - - - the

1	prosecutor specifically invoked the exercise of
2	discretion, specifically mentioned that there would
3	be prejudice from this line of questioning. And I
4	think that's something that we're a little bit
5	ignoring is that there is some aura of prejudice
6	trying to be there's a potential for confusing
7	the issues and this whole idea of police conduct,
8	misconduct, being a a hot topic nowadays,
9	trying to inject that specter into a lawsuit. That -
10	
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that the prejudice that
12	you're referring to?
13	MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, that's part of the
14	prejudice, and I think that's part of what the courts
15	are
16	JUDGE PIGOTT: You're saying because
17	there's allegations among police officers that they
18	commit bad acts that we should not be allowed to ask
19	about bad acts?
20	MS. WERTHEIMER: No, I'm saying I'm
21	saying not never. I'm saying that that's something
22	that should be taken into account when you have
23	minimal probative value, and here there was minimal
24	probative value, that you didn't even show

JUDGE PIGOTT: You - - - you say that but -

1	but the judge didn't say that. He said it's
2	irrelevant.
3	MS. WERTHEIMER: No, the
4	JUDGE PIGOTT: It could be it could
5	be probative as heck
6	MS. WERTHEIMER: The judge in the end
7	the judge in the
8	JUDGE PIGOTT: I was almost done. But
9	that's okay. Go ahead.
10	MS. WERTHEIMER: I'm sorry.
11	JUDGE PIGOTT: That's all right.
12	MS. WERTHEIMER: The judge in the end said
13	that she was basing her ruling based on everything
14	that has been stated. Everything that has been
15	stated included the prosecutor specifically referring
16	to discretion, specifically referring to prejudice,
17	and specifically referring to the fact that the
18	allegations were vague and didn't allege wrongdoing
19	by this particular
20	JUDGE GARCIA: It was a valiant effort, I
21	think, by the prosecutor. But I take that statement
22	as I am not going to allow it based on what has
23	already been stated to mean what I have already
24	stated. Which is this is not relevant.

MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, I submit - - - I

would disagree that it should read - - - I - - - I think if that's what the judge meant she would have just said based on what I have already stated.

JUDGE PIGOTT: Well, she said, "I mean you have a good faith basis but it still seems to be irrelevant."

MS. WERTHEIMER: But she said that before she said I'm ruling based on what already been stated. That was - - - that was way before. Then the judge said how is it relevant and there was a whole other colloquy. In any event, as certainly any error would be harmless, as - - - it gets back to if there was an - - and again, this is an exercise of discretion. I don't think you could really under discount the - - - the prejudice here when there's no showing of specific misconduct by the police officer.

JUDGE RIVERA: Can you just, and your light has gone off, but just in a couple of sentences address the photo array?

MS. WERTHEIMER: The photo array? The photo array, it was a mixed question of law and fact.

The - - - the - - - if you look at the photo array, as the judge said below, and as the Appellate

Division affirmed, the eye condition was not all that noticeable. If you look at the picture, it - - - it

almost looks like all that's happening is that this defendant is looking off to the side, not necessarily that he has an eye condition. So, certainly, in terms of the standard of whether this called for the sugg - - was suggestive and - - and attracted attention to this individual, we would submit not.

We submit also, you know, this is - - there certainly - - it was appropriate to have a hearing, but this was not just a civilian witness. This was a - - a trained police officer who - - and who looked at it carefully, who looked at it for a minute, and certainly, was careful with respect to that. I don't know if you want me to say anything about the sentence.

JUDGE ABDUS-SALAAM: Could you just a couple of words about that?

MS. WERTHEIMER: Okay. With respect to the sentence, the key point we - - - we submit is that the conduct that constituted the prior crime was and continued to be a violent felony at all times. It used to - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What about notice? Is - - is a person contemplating a criminal act supposed to
go to the Penal Law and look at all the different
crimes that - - - that the acts might constitute or -

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MS. WERTHEIMER: Well, I - - - I don't know that a person contemplating an act is going to go and - - - and think in terms of the particular section number as opposed to the conduct. The conduct was the same. The conduct is possessing a loaded firearm outside the home or place of business.

JUDGE STEIN: But how would a defendant know that that conduct was $-\ -\ -$

MS. WERTHEIMER: Because if - - - if you look and you - - - and you look and you see possession of a - - - that - - - that is now CPW 2, and that is listed as a violent felony. And in Morse, this court said that, "Fair notice is provided so long as the elements of the crime when committed were the same as the elements of an offense defined as a violent felony at the time the enhanced sentence is imposed." So this continued to be a violent felony, possession of a loaded firearm outside the home or place of business was always a - - - it was always a violent felony. In addition, the language of the statute, the plain statutory language, says it was a violent felony. This defendant had notice at the time that he was convicted. That's - - - when he was convicted, it was a violent felony. So that also

1 gave him notice that he was subjected to enhanced 2 sentencing on the basis that that was a violent 3 felony. 4 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel. 5 MS. WERTHEIMER: We ask that the judgment 6 be affirmed. Thank you. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Does the use of the word was a violent felony, was, affect your argument? 8 9 MR. ZENO: It's relevant to the argument, 10 Your Honor. I would point to different precise 11 language. 70.70(1)(b) (sic) says, "Violent felony 12 shall have the same meaning as that term is defined 13 in" - - - as that term is defined, is defined in Section 70.02(1). And then you turn to 70.02(1), and 14 15 you do not find this violent felony listed there. 16 The way the legislature set up the violent felony 17 offender sentencing statute is they provided a list of B violent felonies, C violent felonies, D violent 18 19 felonies, and 265.02(4) is not listed there. 20 JUDGE STEIN: You - - - you wouldn't argue 21 that the legislature didn't intend for this to be a 22 felony? 23 MR. ZENO: I think it was - - as I - - -24 as we say in our brief it was a drafting error. 25 There's no question it was a drafting error. That

1 when they made the change to the law and elevated 2 this crime, they didn't realize what they were doing, 3 that they were taking this crime off this list. But they did take this crime off the list, and the 4 5 defendant would not have fair notice. JUDGE STEIN: But they didn't take the 6 7 underlying acts as a crime off the list. MR. ZENO: The - - - the definition - - -8 9 the section number and the name of the crime was 10 taken off the list. It's no longer part of the list. 11 If you were to go to the statute today, you would not find this crime, 265.02(4), listed as a violent 12 13 felony. JUDGE STEIN: How does Morse affect the 14 15 analysis? 16 MR. ZENO: I'm sorry? 17 JUDGE STEIN: Morse, how does Morse affect 18 the analysis? 19 MR. ZENO: Well, Morse was - - - Morse used different language. It - - - it said - - - it had 20 21 backward looking language. It talked in terms of 22 what was a felony, a second - - - and it was a second 23 felony offender statute. It's a different language 24 than this crime, and this crime says - - - you know,

this statute, 70.70, again, I keep going back to

this, 70.70(1)(b) says, "Violent felony shall have 1 the same meaning as that term is defined in 70.02. 2 3 You go to 70.02, and it's not there. So - - - and just if I could just have one more moment - - -4 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Please. MR. ZENO: - - - to - - - to address the 6 7 cross-examination point. I think that this court has never required before if a defendant wants to ask a 8 9 witness, an adverse witness, about prior bad acts, a 10 proffer to prove relevance before asking the 11 question. And that's what the prosecutor is asking 12 for here, that the defendant - - - that the defendant 13 has to prove relevance before they can even ask the 14 question, that the defendant has to prove that the 15 officer was involved in the underlying conduct in a 16 specific identifiable way before you can even ask the 17 officer about - - -JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - -18 19 MR. ZENO: - - - about it.

JUDGE GARCIA: And I think this case is -
- is somewhat different, but wouldn't you agree you
have to do something more than proffer there is a
lawsuit and this person is named, or there is a
lawsuit and it was settled for a million dollars? I
mean does that get you the right to ask anything you

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want about the underlying lawsuit?

MR. ZENO: If you ask a question that - - - if you ask a question about the underlying conduct and the prosecutor objects saying what's your good faith basis for asking that question, then you may need to - - to provide a more specific answer. I have a lawsuit here. It says that Officer Rivera did these acts.

and you're cross-examining your witness and you say did you arrest so-and-so? There's an objection.

Wouldn't - - - didn't this come up in a lot of these cases because the first question out of the box is are you being sued in - - in a civil rights lawsuit or, you know, didn't - - you know, that's the question that sparks the objection. And isn't that an objectionable question?

MR. ZENO: Which question, were you sued or

JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah - - -

MR. ZENO: - - - did you arrest so-and-so?

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - is there a civil

rights lawsuit pending against you, or were you sued, or did this case get dismissed. I mean aren't those the questions that spark this? So if you ask the

1 questions, you're saying you would ask, then you 2 would - - - the next question would be hey, what's 3 your good faith basis for asking that, right. Did 4 you arrest so-and-so and there was a gun alleged to 5 be thrown down in that case, those are objection question. But when you lead with you're named in a -6 7 - - as a defendant in a civil rights lawsuit or I want - - - I want a - - - isn't that different? 8 9 MR. ZENO: Well, that's the - - - that's 10 the wrong way to lead, and - - - and that's not what 11 the lawyer wanted to - - -JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 12 MR. ZENO: - - - ask about here. I think 13 14 it's perfectly appropriate to lead with the question 15 did you arrest John Smith on such-and-such a date on 16 the corner of Eagle and Broadway and claim in a sworn 17 - - - in a sworn criminal court complaint that you 18 observed him engage in a drug transaction. That's a 19 perfectly appropriate lead question for which no 20 proffer in advance is necessary. 21 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. And then what's your 22 good faith basis would be it's an allegation and it's 23

25 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.

MR. ZENO: Correct.

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1	CERTIFICATION				
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3	I, Sara Winkeljohn, certify that the				
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5	Appeals of People v. Charles Smith, No. 109, People				
6	v. Tyrell Ingram, No. 110, and People v. Isma McGhee				
7	No. 111 were prepared using the required				
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